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Hurricane Katrina caused considerable damage to transportation infrastructure, grain 
export facilities, and to some crop areas in 2005. Assuming that financial market participants 
considered the disruption of the grain transportation system by Katrina as having an important 
impact on fundamental supply and demand factors, futures and/or national basis would 
subsequently adjust. The objective of this research was to determine the reaction in corn, wheat, 
and soybean futures and basis due to Katrina using an event study methodology. One parametric 
(Constant mean return) and one nonparametric procedure (Corrado’s rank test) were used to 
define whether there were statistically significant abnormal returns. During Katrina abnormal 
returns were larger on the wheat futures market than on the corn and soybean futures markets, 
which could be partially explained by the timing of the Katrina’s landfall with the grain export 
activities. However, there were only a few statistically significant daily abnormal returns in the 
futures prices due to the hurricane. There was some evidence of significant cumulative abnormal 
returns in the corn and wheat futures markets prior to and surrounding the Katrina’s landfall. In 
conclusion, the majority of the corn market reaction to Katrina’s damage occurred in the basis 
and not in the futures market. For the soybean market there was weak evidence of significant 
reaction in both basis and futures prices. In the case of wheat, the basis was not evaluated and 
wheat futures prices  reacted to the disruption caused by Katrina. The reaction  in the corn, 
wheat and soybean futures prices due to Katrina could have being moderated by the presence of 
large stocks and large expected production levels of these grains in 2005 or simply by the fact 
that the damage caused by the hurricane did not affect fundamental supply and demand factors; 
rather, they only affected transportation logistics.  
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Hurricane Katrina is considered as one of the most devastating natural disasters in U.S. 
history (Knabb, Rhome, and Brown 2005). On August 29, 2005, Katrina made its final landfall at 
the Mississippi border as a Category 3 hurricane
1. Katrina caused considerable damage to the 
transportation infrastructure, grain export facilities, and crop areas in the Mississippi region. In 
2004, 54 percent of the grain exported from the U.S. was moved through the Mississippi River, 
demonstrating the river’s importance to the U.S. grain trade. Moreover, barge deliveries via the 
Mississippi region decreased considerably after Katrina and had not returned to normal levels, 
even two months following the storm (USDA-AMS, 2005).  
 
 
This disruption of the grain transportation system may have decreased the demand of 
grains in U.S. and consequently had a negative effect on cash prices. A market is efficient when 
its prices represent all relevant and available information (Fama et al. 1969). Futures prices 
reveal market expectations regarding supply and demand (Peterson and Tomek, 2000). 
Therefore, if financial market participants considered the disruption of the grain transportation 
system by Katrina as having an important impact on fundamental supply and demand factors, 
futures prices and/or basis would subsequently adjust. The objective of this research was to 
determine the reaction in corn, wheat, and soybean futures and basis on the days surrounding 
Katrina’s landfall.  
 
 
The event study methodology is an analysis that determines whether there is a significant 
reaction in markets to an event that is hypothesized to affect commodity price behavior. Event 
studies have been used to evaluate the effects of information on a diverse array of events in the 
agricultural industry. Milonas (1987) examined the effects of USDA crop forecasts on 
agricultural cash and futures prices. McKenzie and Thomsen (2001) studied the effect of recalls 
for E. Coli O157:H7 on live cattle cash and futures prices.  Hendson and Mazzocchi (2002) 
evaluated the economic impact of the announcement made by UK government regarding the link 
between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and human health on the beef and beef-
related industries. King, Wilson and Naseem (2002) evaluated the effect on the stock prices of 
the firms involved in the announcement of the two largest mergers and acquisitions in the 
agricultural industry, the merger of Astra and Zeneca, and DuPont’s acquisition of Pioneer. Most 
recently, Rucker, Thurman and Yoder (2005) developed a novel model--the distributional event 
response model (DERM) -- which allowed them to evaluate and compare the effects of three 
types of events on lumber futures prices. Furthermore, event study research in other fields has 
shown that the market value of insurance firms is significantly affected by catastrophic events, 
such as hurricanes (Angbazo and Narayanan 1996; Lamb 1998).  
 
 
                                                 
1 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1-5 rating, where as larger is the number as larger is the hurricane’s 
intensity.    4 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 
Event study is an important methodology that measures the economic effects of a 
particular event on a firm, industry or market through the evaluation of asset prices (MacKinlay, 
1997). Based on MacKinlay (1997), the event-study methodology consists of the following steps: 
1) determination of the events of interest and the event window; 2) selection of the sample of 
commodity prices to include in the analysis; 3) estimation of normal returns during the 
estimation period; 4) calculation of abnormal returns within the event window; and 5) 
determination of whether the abnormal returns are statistically different from zero.  
 
 
According to Mckenzie, Thomsen, and Dixon (2004), two of the most used parametric 
and nonparametric procedures in event studies on agricultural futures markets are the constant 
mean return (CMR), and the Corrado’s rank test, respectively. Parametric procedures depend on 
assumptions regarding the return distribution. An alternative method to analyze the economic 
impact of events with a return distribution that is not normally distributed is to use nonparametric 
tests (Corrado, 1989; Cowan, 1992). Nonparametric tests do not require the same rigorous 
assumptions regarding return distributions as parametric tests. Thus, one parametric (CMR) and 
one nonparametric procedure (Corrado’s rank test ) were used to define whether there was a 
statistically significant effect on corn, wheat, and soybean futures prices and basis from the 
disruptions that occurred in the grain transportation system due to Katrina.  
 
 
This research used the daily futures prices for December 2005 corn and wheat and the 
November 2005 soybean contracts from the Chicago Board of Trade. Additionally, the daily 
cash prices for corn and soybean were the National corn index (NCI) and the National soybean 
index (NSI) respectively. These indexes are calculated by the Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
(MGEX, 2006) and are an average of the daily cash price from approximately 90% of elevator 
bids in U.S. (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The basis analysis did not include wheat because of the 
difficulty of finding a National wheat cash price index. Two corn basis series (September and 





Even though CMR is considered to be the simplest procedure to evaluate event studies, 
research has found that CMR usually obtains similar results and conclusions to those obtained 
from more complex procedures (Brown and Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997). However, a recent 
simulation study by Mckenzie, Thomsen, and Dixon (2004) has criticized the common 
methodology of using a short 8-day estimation period in the CMR procedure. These authors 
found that the use of short normal periods causes CMR to falsely reject the null hypothesis (Type   5 
I error). Instead, these researchers found that a CMR model using an estimation period of 61 
days is appropriate for evaluating the null hypothesis.  
 
 
Since most of the research done in the futures market has used a short estimation period 
of 8 days, two estimation periods were selected in order to assess their performance: an 8- and a 
61-day period. The estimation period was determined as the following: (T1, T2), where T1 is the 
first day, and T2 is the last day of the estimation period (Figure 3). The event period begins at 
τA= T2 + 1 and ends on the day τB . The event day (τ0) for Katrina was considered to be the day of 
the hurricane landfall: August 29, 2005.  
 
Returns were defined as daily percentage changes in the price of the commodity futures 
and were calculated as follows:  
100 ) / ln( 1 × = − it it it P P R                     () 1 
 
where Rit is the daily percentage change in the price return, and Pit is the observed i commodity 
futures price on day t. The normal return is defined as Rh and is the average of  it R  calculated 
over the estimation period. Both the 8- and 61-day estimation periods for Katrina overlap with 
the occurrence of the crop production report released by the USDA on August 12
th. Most 
research has found that crop production reports cause abnormal returns on corn, wheat, and 
soybean futures prices (Milonas, 1987; Sumner and Mueller, 1989; Fortenbery and Sumner 
1993). To obtain a representative estimation of normal returns, the exact, previous and following 
days of the release of the crop production report were excluded from the estimation periods.  
 
The abnormal returns (ARit) were estimated for each commodity i on each day t during 
the event window as the difference between the observed and the normal returns: 
     h it it R R AR − =                     () 2 
 
The total reaction of commodity i during hurricane Katrina can be determined through 
the aggregation of abnormal returns into a cumulative abnormal return (CAR): 
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Thus, CARi represents the total impact of the hurricane Katrina on commodity i during 
the event window (τA,τB).  To determine whether Katrina had a negative impact on commodity i 
futures prices, the following hypothesis was tested: 
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Similarly, to define whether Katrina had weakened basis on commodity i the following null 
hypothesis was tested: 
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The test statistic (
i CMR T ) to test the null hypothesis was: 
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where the variance of CARi was the following: 
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TCMR follows a t-student distribution with total degrees of freedom equal to the number of days 
in the estimation period minus one (N - 1). Additionally, the daily abnormal return 
i CAR = i AR   can be evaluated with the CMR t-test (TCMR ) of Equation 4. 
 
 
CAR values were estimated for three event windows: (τ -4, τ0), (τ -2, τ2) and (τ 0, τ4).The 
event window (τ -4, τ0) estimated the reaction of the market in anticipation of the hurricane 
landfall. Conversely, (τ 0, τ4) evaluated the effect on the commodity prices as the market was 
assimilating the reports of damage, and (τ -2, τ2) measured the market reaction surrounding the 
hurricane landfall.  
 
Corrado’s rank test 
 
Corrado’s ranking procedure transforms the distribution of returns into a uniform 
distribution across the possible rank values, regardless of any asymmetry in the original 
distribution (McKenzie and Thomsen, 2001). Additionally, the rank test combines the estimation 
and event periods and determines a rank for each daily return (Cowan, 1992). Thus, rank one 
corresponds to the smallest abnormal return, while the largest rank corresponds to the largest 
abnormal return (Cowan, 1992). Kit represents the rank of the abnormal return ARit in the daily 
abnormal return. The mean rank is one-half plus half the number of observed returns (Kmeani). 
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τ  7 
where d is the number of days in the event window, Kh is the average rank across the event 
window, Ki is the average rank across the estimation and event periods, and K is the combined 
number of trading days in the estimation and event periods. Furthermore, ZRANKi follows a t-








A summary of public news regarding Katrina’s progress was collected from LexisNexis 
and Factiva (Table 1). Under the assumption that grain markets are efficient markets, all relevant 
and available information should be included in current asset prices (Fama et al., 1969). In 
addition, following the hypothesis that Katrina may have decreased the demand of grains 
because of the transportation disruption, and consequently to cause a negative effect on cash 
and/or futures prices. It is expected that financial markets would consider information regarding 
the development of the hurricane over time and space as valuable information. Thus, these news 




On Tuesday, August 23
rd (τ -4), Katrina was considered a tropical depression and was 
predicted to hit the eastern site of the Gulf of Mexico (Table 1). For corn futures prices (Table 2) 
and wheat futures prices (Table 3), the abnormal returns obtained for τ -4 were negative in both 
the CMR t-test and the rank test in both the 8- and 61-day estimation periods. These results 
imply that Katrina had a negative effect on the futures prices of both commodities, as was 
expected. However, the abnormal return on τ -4 was statistically significant only for wheat futures 
prices in the CMR t-test when the 8-day estimation period was used. In contrast, the abnormal 
returns obtained on soybean futures prices were positive, but were not statistically significant 
(Table 4). Thus, wheat was the only commodity with some evidence that the market may have 
anticipated some potential damage caused by Katrina. 
 
 
   On August 24
th (τ -3), new reports regarding the development of Katrina warned that it 
was even more likely to make landfall in the Gulf of Mexico. The abnormal returns on τ -3 were 
negative for all commodities, but were not statistically different from zero. This result suggests 




th (τ -2), corn futures prices had negative, but not statistically significant 
abnormal returns. Wheat futures prices had positive abnormal returns that were not statistically 
significant. These unexpected positive abnormal returns on wheat futures prices could be 
explained by the USDA weekly export sales report during τ -2, which announced an increase in 
wheat demand (Table 5). The abnormal returns were negative and statistically significant for   8 
soybean futures prices in both the CMR t-test and the rank test, using the 8-day estimation period 
(Table 4). This result may be explained by the argument that the soybean market may have 
viewed the possibility that rain coming from Katrina could benefit yields in some soybean areas 
(Table 1), given that precipitation and soil moisture are extremely important during pod fill in 
soybean (Andresen et al., 2001). Therefore, there is some evidence that on τ -2, Katrina caused a 
negative and significant reaction in anticipation of the hurricane landfall.  
 
 
On Friday, August 26
th (τ -1), the abnormal returns to corn and wheat futures prices were 
negative, but were not statistically different from zero. In contrast, the abnormal return during τ -1 
in the soybean market was positive, but not statistically significant. These positive abnormal 




The abnormal return during August 29
th (τ0) was negative, but was not statistically 
significant for wheat futures prices. In contrast, positive abnormal returns, but not statistically 
significant were observed during Katrina’s landfall in both the corn and soybean markets. Two 
possible explanations for these insignificant abnormal returns are the following. First, the grain 
market could have already incorporated the effect of Katrina’s landfall. Second, the grain market 
considered that Katrina would disrupt grain exports for only few days. Consequently, the market 
did not interpret these reports regarding Katrina’s landfall as relevant, new information, and 




th (τ1), it was confirmed that the damage caused by Katrina would 
interrupt grain exports for at least a few days. The abnormal returns on τ1 were negative, but were 
not statistically significant for corn and wheat futures prices. In contrast, a positive but not 
statistically significant abnormal return was observed in the soybean market. As previously 
mentioned, these positive abnormal returns in the soybean market may be explained by 
continuous rumors regarding the increase of Chinese demand and by the possible direct damage 




st (τ2), two levees in New Orleans broke, further damaging the port, and it 
became evident that the time to repair this damage would be longer than previously thought 
(Table 1). The wheat market reacted to this new information, as represented by the negative and 
statistically significant abnormal returns in both estimation periods. The wheat futures prices 
adjusted rapidly in the expected direction to this unanticipated information, which supports the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Unexpectedly, the abnormal returns on (τ2) in the corn and soybean 
markets were negative, but were not statistically significant. These results may suggest that 
wheat futures prices were more sensitive to the disruption of the transportation system due to 
Katrina than corn and soybean futures prices. A possible explanation is that by the time Katrina 
occurred wheat had already been harvested, whereas corn and soybean harvest had not yet 
started and the market may had considered that the transportation system would be restored 
before harvest was underway.   9 
 
 
Positive and statistically significant abnormal returns were observed on September 1
st (τ 
3) in the corn market. Furthermore, the abnormal returns on τ 3 for the wheat futures prices were 
positive and statistically significant in the rank tests using both estimation periods. Soybean 
futures prices were positive, but were only statistically significant in the rank test using the 8-day 
estimation period. These unexpected positive results could be partially explained by two reasons. 
First, there were rumors among traders proclaiming that the disruption of exports would not last 
as long as previously thought (Table 1). Second, local and fund short covering, technical buying, 
as well as index fund buying in the corn market caused commodity prices to increase (Table 5).  
 
 
On Friday September 2
nd (τ4), the abnormal returns were negative and statistically 
significant on corn futures prices. This result may be partially explained by the larger private 
crop estimates and the uncertainty regarding the consequences of Katrina on the U.S. grain 
transportation system (Table 5). The abnormal returns on τ 4 were negative as well for wheat and 
soybean futures prices, but were not statistically different from zero. 
 
 
CAR values can provide information on the strength and direction of the total impact of 
Katrina on each commodity. All CAR values on corn futures prices were negative (Table 6). The 
CAR value on corn futures prices for the prior-event window (τ -4, τ0) was -4.34 when using the 
8-day estimation period and -3.02 when using the 61-day estimation period. The only statistically 
significant CAR values occurred in the CMR t-test using the 8-day estimation period during the 
prior and surrounding event windows. These results imply that there was a significant reaction 
on corn futures prices prior to and surrounding the hurricane landfall (Table 6).  
 
 
The CAR values on wheat futures prices for the prior-event window (τ -4, τ0) were -3.09 
and -5.12 when using the 8- and 61-day estimation periods, respectively (Table 6). Furthermore, 
the CAR values on wheat futures prices for the prior and surrounding event windows were 
negative and statistically significant in the CMR t–test using the 8-day estimation period. The 
surrounding-event window obtained the largest and most significant CAR value among the three 
event windows evaluated. This result may indicate that most of the market reaction regarding the 
impact of Katrina in the wheat market occurred on the days surrounding the hurricane’s landfall.  
 
 
In the case of soybean futures prices, none of the CAR values were statistically 
significant. Additionally, the post-event window (τ 0, τ4) had a positive CAR value when the 8-
day estimation period was used. These insignificant CAR values may be partially explained by 
the fact that Katrina had two opposite effects on soybean futures prices. First, the negative price 
effect was due to the disruption of the transportation system and the expectation of beneficial 
yield-increasing rain during τ -2. Second, the positive effect was due to potential crop losses from 
heavy rains and wind in the U.S. Delta region during τ 1 (Table 5).  
 
   10 
Overall, most of the signs of the statistical tests were consistent for all of the results 
obtained from the two estimation periods. However, the degree of significance of abnormal 
returns depended on the estimation period and on the statistical test. Furthermore, in all 
commodities, most of the estimated CMR t –tests using the 8-day estimation period were larger 
in magnitude than those using the 61-day estimation period. Consistent with Mckenzie, 
Thomsen, and Dixon (2004), it was more likely that an abnormal return would be statistically 
significant using the 8-day versus the 61-day period. Subsequently, it was more likely for a Type 
I error to occur (i.e., obtaining a significant impact from Katrina in the future market when in 
reality, there was no adjustment in prices). However, in this research the 61-day estimation 
period includes the growing season, which is the most volatile time of futures prices (Goodwin 
and Schnepf, 2000). This increase on variance in the 61-day estimation period could explain its 
failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 
In addition, most of the CAR values were not statistically significant in the rank test. 
Therefore, the parametric (CMR) and nonparametric (rank) statistical tests had contradictory 
results regarding the futures market reaction to Katrina. Moreover, Brown and Warner (1985) 
found that variance increases during the event days, which causes parametric tests to yield 
statistically significant abnormal returns where none actually exists more often than expected 
when stock prices are evaluated. Thus, an increase in variances in the event period could cause 
the differences found on the degree of significance of the CAR values between the statistical 
tests. However, in all cases, the variances were not statistically different between the estimation 
period and the event period using a Levene’s homogenous variances test (data not shown). 
Therefore, the failure to reject the null hypothesis in the rank test was not due to an increase in 




The daily abnormal return on the September corn basis for August 25
th (τ -2) was 2.57 and 
statistically significant in the rank test in both estimation periods (Table 7). This positive and 
statistically significant reaction implied that the national corn basis weakened 0.75 cents per 
bushel from -45.95 to -46.70. Additionally, the abnormal returns were positive and statistically 
significant during Katrina’s landfall (τ 0) in both the CMR t-test and the rank test in both the 8- 
and 61-day estimation periods. The reaction during τ 0 was larger and more significant than the 
reaction observed during τ -2, when the national corn basis widened by 1.89 cents per bushel from 
- 46.61 to - 48.50.  
 
 
Positive and statistically significant abnormal returns were observed on the September 
soybean basis during August 30
th (τ 1) in both statistical tests when the 8-day estimation period 
was used (Table 8). This positive reaction indicated that the national soybean basis weakened by 
1.28 cents per bushel from -26.76 to -28.04. Moreover, larger positive and significant abnormal 
returns to the basis were observed on September 1
st (τ 3). However, this reaction was likely 
caused by a technical buying, as well as index fund buying that occurred in the commodities 
future market (Table 5).    11 
 
 
Futures price volatility increases as contract maturity approaches (Milonas 1986; 
Galloway and Kolb, 1996). This effect is known as Samuelson effect or maturity effect. As 
Galloway and Kolb states (1996, p 809) the “price of futures contracts close to expiration react 
more strongly to new information about the commodity than do prices of more distant contracts.” 
Katrina’s landfall occurred on August 29
th, about two weeks before the September contracts 
expired. Hence, any reaction during the days surrounding Katrina’s landfall could be due to a 
confounding effect between Katrina and/or Samuelson effects when using the September basis 




When analyzing the corn December basis, the abnormal return was positive on August 
25
th but only statistically significant using the rank test (Table 9). Thus, there was weaker 
evidence of significant reaction during τ -2 using the December basis (Table 9) than the 
September basis (Table 7). In contrast, the abnormal return on τ 0 was positive and significant in 
both statistical tests. In the case of the soybean November basis, there was no evidence of a 
significant reaction on August 30
th. The only significant abnormal return occurred during 
September 1
st, which is likely due to technical buying (Table 9).  
 
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
 
During Katrina, daily abnormal returns were larger in the wheat market than in the corn 
and soybean markets. These results were unexpected since corn and soybean exports are more 
dependent on the Mississippi Gulf than wheat exports. A possible explanation of these results is 
the coincidence of the hurricane’s landfall with grain export activities. Katrina’s effect occurred 
at the end of the last week of August and first week of September. Over the last five years, 
weekly volumes of wheat exports were larger than the weekly volumes of corn and soybean 
export during these weeks (Figure 4). As a result, wheat futures prices may have been more 
sensitive to Katrina’s disruptions than corn and soybean futures prices. 
 
 
Significant daily abnormal returns occurred on τ-4, τ2, and τ3 for wheat futures prices 
during Katrina. For corn futures prices, significant abnormal returns were observed on τ3, and τ4, 
whereas soybean futures prices had significant abnormal returns on τ-2, and τ3. However, 
abnormal returns on τ3 and τ4 can not be attributed only to Katrina because of the presence of 
technical and index fund buying and higher private crop estimates during those days, 
respectively. Therefore, the most conclusive daily abnormal returns occurred during τ-2 for the 
soybean future prices and during τ2 for the wheat future prices.
 3 Additionally, there was weak 
                                                 
2 The nearby basis series was not used because the potential bias on the abnormal return during September 1
st due to 
the effect of switching between the September contract and the following contract. The abnormal returns obtained 
on September 1
st using the nearby basis series for corn and soybean were 35% and 42%, respectively. 
3 The significance of the daily abnormal returns on corn futures prices did not vary whether the September or 
December contract was evaluated. Similarly, conclusions regarding the reaction on the soybean futures prices were 
the same when using the September or November contract.   12 
evidence of significant CAR reaction in the corn and wheat markets prior to and surrounding 
Katrina’s landfall.  
 
 
Significant daily abnormal returns on the national corn basis occurred on τ0 for both basis 
series evaluated (September and December). Additionally, there was some evidence that the 
national corn basis widened on τ-2 in anticipation of the hurricane’s landfall. The most definite 
daily abnormal return on the soybean basis occurred on September 1
st, however, it can not be 
attributed only to Katrina because of the presence of technical and index fund buying. The only 
indication that Katrina may have some effect on the national soybean basis was the weak 
reaction on August 30
th. In conclusion, the majority of the corn market reaction to Katrina’s 
damage occurred in the basis and not in the futures market. For the soybean market there a was 
weak significant reaction in both futures prices and basis. In the case of wheat, basis was not 
evaluated and wheat futures prices reacted to the disruption caused by Katrina.  
 
 
The absence of larger daily abnormal returns on the corn, wheat and soybean futures 
prices and basis due to Katrina could be partially explained by four factors. First, the grain 
market determined that the damage caused by the hurricane did not affect fundamental supply 
and demand factors; rather, only transportation logistics were affected. Second, the grain market 
may have considered that the grain export volumes would recover to normal levels by the 
maturity of the contracts. Third, the use of options markets may have decreased the possible 
impact on futures prices due to the hurricane. Fortenbery and Summer (1993) found that the use 
of options markets in corn and soybean has reduced the reaction and variation on futures prices 
due to USDA production reports. However, the trading volumes did not increase and the prices 
did not change very much for the corn and soybean options on the Chicago Board of Trade 
surrounding Katrina’s landfall. Finally, the magnitude of the impact of Katrina and Rita on the 
grain futures prices depended on the economic context in which it occurred. Research has found 
that price reaction to news regarding supply and demand may be conditional on the state of the 
market (e.g., Kenyon et al. 1987; Colling, Irwin and Zulauf, 1996). Stock levels and crop size are 
two state variables that may have influenced the effect of the hurricane on commodity futures 
prices. Storage compensates for disturbances and the prospect of further fluctuations in the 
future, thus reducing the effects of uncertain events (Williams and Wright, 1991). In addition, a 
potential shock in the supply and demand could have a small effect on prices if the estimate of 
the new crop production was large (Williams and Wright, 1991; Goodwin and Schnepf, 2000). In 
2004, the corn and soybean crops were the largest in U.S. history, creating large stock levels for 
2005 (USDA-NASS, 2005). Furthermore, the last USDA crop production report before Katrina 
was released on August 12, 2005, and predicted relatively large crops. Consequently, these large 
stock and production levels could have moderated the effect of Katrina and Rita on corn and 













































































































































































































































Figure 3 Diagram of the timeline of the event study evaluated.  
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   17 
Table 2 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for the 
significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on corn December 2005 futures prices   
   8-Day   61-Day 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank    
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 -1.17  -0.98 -0.61   -0.91  -0.48  -0.38 
8/24/2005  τ -3 -1.07  -0.84 -0.41   -0.80  -0.42  -0.34 
8/25/2005  τ -2 -1.42  -1.18 -1.22   -1.15  -0.61  -0.67 
8/26/2005  τ -1 -1.20  -1.00 -0.82   -0.93  -0.49  -0.43 
8/29/2005  τ 0 0.52  0.43 0.82    0.78  0.41  0.77 
8/30/2005  τ 1 -0.74  -0.61 0.20    -0.48  -0.25  -0.14 
8/31/2005  τ 2 -1.20  -1.00 -1.02      -0.94 -0.49  -0.48 
9/01/2005  τ 3 2.34  1.95
2 1.63
1   2.60  1.37
1 1.63
1 
9/02/2005  τ 4 -2.56  -2.14
2 -1.63





 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a one-tailed t-test. 
 
 
   18 
 
Table 3 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for the 
significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on wheat December 2005 futures prices   
   8-Day    61-Day 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank    
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 -1.96 -1.43
1 -1.22  -1.56  -1.08  -1.15 
8/24/2005  τ -3  -1.30  -0.95 -0.61   -0.89  -0.62  -0.62 
8/25/2005  τ -2 0.37  0.27  0.41    0.77 0.54  0.86 
8/26/2005  τ -1  -1.45  -1.06 -1.02   -1.05  -0.73  -0.77 
8/29/2005  τ 0 -0.77 -0.56  0.20    -0.37  -0.25  -0.10 
8/30/2005  τ 1 -1.31 -0.96  -0.82    -0.91  -0.63  -0.67 
8/31/2005  τ 2 -2.18 -1.59
1 -1.43
1     -1.78 -1.23  -1.39
1 
9/01/2005  τ 3 1.17 0.85  1.43
1   1.58  1.09  1.39
1 
9/02/2005  τ 4 -1.17 -0.85  -0.20    -0.76  -0.53  -0.48 
 The symbols 
1, 
2, and
 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a one-tailed t-test. 
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Table 4 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for the 
significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on soybean November 2005 futures prices   
   8-Day   61-Day 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank    
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 0.96 0.68  0.41    0.48  0.22  0.30 
8/24/2005  τ -3 -0.82 -0.58  -0.61    -1.30  -0.60  -0.85 
8/25/2005  τ -2 -2.04 -1.44
1 -1.43
1   -2.52  -1.16  -1.26 
8/26/2005  τ -1 1.15 0.81  0.82    0.66  0.31  0.40 
8/29/2005  τ 0 1.10 0.78  0.61    0.62  0.28  0.35 
8/30/2005  τ 1 1.26 0.89  1.02    0.78  0.36  0.45 
8/31/2005  τ 2 -1.59 -1.12  -1.02      -2.07 -0.95  -1.10 
9/01/2005  τ 3 1.81 1.27  1.43
1   1.32  0.61  0.85 
9/02/2005  τ 4 -0.89 -0.63  -0.82    -1.37  -0.63  -0.95 
 The symbols 
1, 
2, and
 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
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Table 6 CAR and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for the significance of Hurricane 
Katrina’s effect on corn, wheat, and soybean futures prices  
 Window  8-Day    61-Day 
Commodity (τ1, τ2) CAR TCMR Z Rank   CAR  TCMR Z Rank 
Corn  (-4,0) -4.34  -1.62
1 -1.00   -3.02  -0.71  -0.47 
                
 (-2,2)  -4.05  -1.51
1 -0.91   -2.72  -0.64  -0.43 
                
 (0,4)  -1.65  -0.62  -0.46    -0.33  -0.08  0.19 
                
Wheat  (-4,0) -5.12  -2.53
1 -1.00   -3.09  -0.97  -0.79 
                
 (-2,2)  -5.35  -2.65
1 -1.19   -3.33  -1.05  -0.92 
                
 (0,4)  -4.27  -2.11  -0.37    -2.24  -0.71  -0.56 
                
Soybean  (-4,0) 0.30 0.09  -0.09    -1.77 -0.37  -0.32 
                
 (-2,2)  -0.33  -0.10  -0.46    -2.39  -0.51  -0.36 
                




 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a one-tailed t-test. 
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Table 7 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for 
the significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on corn September 2005 basis   
   8-Day    61-Day 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank  
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 -1.08 -0.69 -1.02   -1.44  -0.83 -0.95 
8/24/2005  τ -3 -0.36 -0.23  0.00   -0.71  -0.41 -0.40 
8/25/2005  τ -2 2.57 1.65
1 1.43
1   2.22  1.28 1.36
1 
8/26/2005  τ -1 -1.50 -0.96  -1.43
1   -1.86  -1.08 -1.26 
8/29/2005  τ 0 3.73 2.39
2 1.63
2   3.37  1.94
2 1.66
2 
8/30/2005  τ 1 -0.36 -0.23 -0.20   -0.72  -0.42 -0.45 
8/31/2005  τ 2 -0.67 -0.43 -0.82   -1.03  -0.59 -0.65 
9/1/2005  τ 3 1.96 1.26  1.02   1.60  0.93 1.15 
9/2/2005  τ 4 1.17 0.75  0.61   0.82  0.47 0.55 
The symbols 1, 2, and 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test.  
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Table 8 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for 
the significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on soybean September 2005 basis   
   8-Day    61-Day 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank  
Abnormal 
Returns TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 0.34  0.15 -0.41   -1.04  -0.23 -0.45 
8/24/2005  τ -3 -1.91 -0.82 -1.02   -3.30  -0.73 -0.90 
8/25/2005  τ -2 0.95  0.41  0.20   -0.43  -0.10 -0.05 
8/26/2005  τ -1 1.97  0.85  0.82   0.59  0.13 0.35 
8/29/2005  τ 0 -1.92 -0.82 -1.22   -3.30  -0.73 -0.95 
8/30/2005  τ 1 5.55 2.38
2 1.43
1   4.17  0.93 1.15 
8/31/2005  τ 2 0.05 0.02 -0.61   -1.33  -0.30 -0.60 
9/1/2005  τ 3 11.15 4.78
3 1.63
2   9.77  2.17 1.66
1 
9/2/2005  τ 4 5.07 2.17
2 1.22   3.69  0.82 1.05 
The symbols 1, 2, and 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test.  
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Table 9 Daily abnormal returns and t-test values of the CMR and the rank analysis for the 
significance of Hurricane Katrina’s effect on corn basis relative to the December 2005 
contract and on soybean basis relative to the November 2005 contract. 
    Corn basis    Soybean basis 
Date Day 
Abnormal 
Returns‡ TCMR Z Rank    
Abnormal 
Returns‡ TCMR Z Rank 
8/23/2005  τ -4 -0.83  -0.61  -0.98   -1.53  -0.61  -1.16 
8/24/2005  τ -3 -0.32  -0.23  -0.39   -1.19  -0.48  -0.97 
8/25/2005  τ -2 1.75  1.28  1.37
1   0.91  0.36  0.77 
8/26/2005  τ -1 -0.06  -0.04  -0.20   0.97  0.39  0.97 
8/29/2005  τ 0 4.11  2.99
3 1.77
1   0.15  0.06  -0.58 
8/30/2005  τ 1 0.20  0.14  0.79   0.89  0.36  0.58 
8/31/2005  τ 2 -0.53  -0.38 -0.59     0.84 0.34  0.19 
9/01/2005  τ 3 0.26  0.19  0.98   5.05  2.03
2 1.55
1 




 3 represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a one-tailed t-test. 
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